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Abstract 
The development and testing of computational models of cognition is typically ad hoc: few 
generally agreed methodological principles guide the process. Consequently computational mod- 
els often conflate empirically justified mechanisms with pragmatic implementation details, and 
essential theoretical aspects of theories are frequently hard to identify. We argue that attempts 
to construct cognitive theories would be considerably assisted by the availability of appropriate 
languages for specifying cognitive models. Such languages should: ( 1) be syntactically clear and 
succinct; (2) be operationally well defined; (3) be executable; and (4) explicitly support the divi- 
sion between theory and implementation detail. In support of our arguments we introduce Sceptic, 
an executable specification language which goes some way towards satisfying these requirements. 
Sceptic has been successfully used to implement a number of cognitive models including Soar, 
and details of the Sceptic specification of Soar are included in a technical appendix. The sim- 
plicity of Sceptic Soar permits the essentials of the underlying cognitive theory to be seen, and 
aids investigation of alternative theoretical assumptions. We demonstrate this by reporting three 
computational experiments involving modifications to the functioning of working memory within 
Soar. Although our focus is on Soar, the thrust of the work is more concerned with general 
methodological issues in cognitive modelling. 
1. Introduction 
The natural complexity and variability of ordinary human behaviour creates a need for 
considerable methodological sophistication in cognitive research. Consequently, students 
of experimental cognitive psychology are routinely trained in rigorous experimental 
design and data analysis. Notwithstanding the many ambiguities of cognitive theory, the 
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criteria by which experimental research arc judged are public and largely uncontroversial. 
On the theoretical side the situation is less satisfactory. Most theoretical discussion in 
psychology is informal. Theories are often presented in terms of box and arrow diagrams 
(see, e.g., [ 3.29.421 1, or draw on natural language metaphors (see, e.g., [ 4 I 1). but the 
box-arrow notation and its underlyin g assumptions are generally poorly specified, and 
it has been argued that “attractive metaphors raise more obscurities than they resolve” 
[ 39. p. 4021. This informal approach restricts the field’s ability to make clear theoretical 
statements. 
In response, many cognitive scientists have looked for more satisfactory ways of 
formulating their theories. Frequently they have turned to computational modelling tech- 
niques (both connectionist and symbolic) for developing and presenting their proposals. 
Such techniques lead to precise statements of theory by forcing the detailed specification 
of all aspects essential to the theory’s implementation, including many aspects which 
might otherwise be overlooked. Computational techniques also allow predictions to be 
drawn from those theories by simulation. 
Sound methodological principles are necessary, however, if the full potential of com- 
putational techniques is to be delivered to cognitive science. Without such principles 
there are two clear dangers. Firstly, unconstrained programming allows the exploration 
of alternative computational mechanisms with little theoretical foundation. Such exper- 
imental programming may lcad to programs which replicate empirical data, but the 
strategy is in direct conflict with the standard scientific method of evaluating a theory 
by testing its predictions. In addition, if such programs are to further our understanding 
of the phenomena in question. some form of reverse engineering is required in order to 
derive from the program an explanation of its behaviour. Secondly, the unconstrained 
implementation of a theory can lead to situations where the program details obscure the 
asserted theory. The abstract nature of psychological theorising requires that, for com- 
putational completeness, any computational instantiation of a theory will include aspects 
which are not theoretically motivated. Without appropriate methodological principles, 
the distinction within the implementation between theoretically motivated aspects and 
implementation details cannot be ensured. Moreover, the independence of simulation 
results from supposedly irrelevant implementation details cannot be determined. 
The utility of sound, systematic methodologies can be seen in a number of fields. 
Computer science, for example, has developed rapidly in recent years, with the intro- 
duction of systematic software development methodologies (e.g., ]37,47] ) and formal 
languages for specifying program designs (e.g., 1441 ). AI technologists (those primar- 
ily interested in AI as a technical discipline rather than as a natural science) have, 
furthermore, successfully applied formal frameworks in many areas, such as computa- 
tional linguistics (e.g., [ 5. 191 ), reasoning ( e.g.. [ 15.2 I] ), knowledge representation 
(e.g., [ 121 ), uncertainty and decision making (e.g.. [ I] ) and expert systems (e.g., 
[ 451 ). There is now a general consensus that increased use of formal design and sys- 
tematic programming methods yields deeper understanding and greater predictability of 
software, leads to clearer communication, and facilitates independent assessment of pro- 
grams and their underlying principles. While the methods and tools of mathematicians 
and engineers are not necessarily central to the natural sciences, whose core is empir- 
ical investigation. with better techniques for formulating and presenting computational 
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theories, and a stronger methodology for developing and testing them, cognitive science 
would seem likely to advance more certainly. 
Further motivation for the development of improved modelling methodologies comes 
from an examination of the goals and methods currently advocated in computational 
psychology. In particular, Newell has argued that “it is time to get going on producing 
unified theories of cognition-before the [empirical] database doubles again and the 
number of [theoretical] clashes increases by the square or the cube” [ 3 1, p. 251 and Soar 
[ 23,3 1,401 can be seen as the culmination of his long-argued position that psychological 
theorists must aim for cumulative development and avoid paradigm-related, transitory 
fashions [ 301. In this vein Newell [31] argues that the work of the Soar community 
represents a research programme in the tradition of Imre Lakatos [25]. In such a 
programme any one incarnation of a theory may prove to be incorrect in peripheral 
details but advances in understanding are made possible by building progressively upon 
a hard core. In the case of Soar this progression is embodied in a series of related 
computer programs, each aiming to provide a more adequate theoretical account than 
its predecessors. 
At this point, however, we have to question whether currently available methodolo- 
gies for designing, implementing and documenting computational theories match up to 
Newell’s challenge. Take Soar itself. From the point of view of theoretical methodology 
Soar seems more sophisticated than much current cognitive psychological modelling. 
Statements of Soar as a theory of cognition are, like most psychological theories, infor- 
mal; a set of claims and assumptions about cognitive processing expressed in ordinary 
English (e.g., [ 3 1,401). As we argue below, however, there is a substantial gap between 
these informal statements and the computational realisation of the theory as a LISP or 
C program. This gap has important consequences for evaluating Soar. It brings into 
question the degree to which Soar can truly be said to be a well-articulated cognitive 
theory, and the degree to which the implementations can be said to be accurate realisa- 
tions of that theory (see [ lo] ). This is not a criticism of Soar or the Soar community, 
but a general methodological weakness which undermines computational research. We 
need to be able to express our theories in ways that are more open to detailed scrutiny; 
less ambiguously enmeshed in particular technologies; more easily evaluated against 
generally accepted criteria of adequacy; and hence more easily compared. 
This paper describes an attempt to address these problems by applying some lessons 
from AI and computer science. Our goal is an executable specification language: a 
language for expressing theoretical proposals which avoids, as far as possible, the diffi- 
culties mentioned earlier. Such a language should provide a notation for succinctly and 
clearly formulating proposals regarding the properties and interdependencies of putative 
cognitive mechanisms. In addition it should provide a way of executing or animating 
the theory to determine how it will truly behave. Finally, the language should explic- 
itly support the distinction between theoretically motivated aspects and implementation 
details. 
We begin with what is essentially a requirements analysis. We survey existing forms 
of theory articulation, highlighting the failings of a variety of current methods, before 
arguing for the utility of executable specification languages and the necessity of the 
theory/implementation distinction. In Section 3 we introduce Sceptic, an executable 
specification language which we have used to implement a number of current psy- 
chological theories, including Soar, and discuss the extent to which it addresses the 
issues detailed in Section 2. Section 4 relates our experience with Sceptic as a cogni- 
tive modelling language. Specifically, we consider the use of Sceptic in the large-scale 
reconstruction of Soar, the generality of Sceptic (as evidenced by the implementation 
of a number of less extensive theories), and the utility of Sceptic in facilitating compu- 
tational experimentation (as evidenced by three experimental modifications to the Soar 
reconstruction). We conclude with a discussion of the role of a modelling language 
such as Sceptic in a wider methodology for cognitive modelling. For completeness, 
annotated details of the Sceptic specification of Soar are given in an appendix. While 
the work reported here is developed in the context of symbolic modelling, many of the 
methodological points apply equally well to connectionist modelling. 
2. Issues in theory specification 
Central to any systematic methodology for cognitive modelling must be techniques 
for the description or specitication of theories. Within cognitive psychology, a number of 
such techniques are currently used, including natural language descriptions, information 
processing diagrams, computer programs, and (more rarely) formal specifications. Each 
of these approaches has its advantages, but each also has serious problems. In this section 
we examine the above forms of theory articulation and consider how their failings might 
be addressed. 
2.1. Current forms of theory cwticulutiott: CL critique 
The relative merits of the various approaches to theory specification are most clearly 
illustrated with respect to a concrete example. In the following discussion we therefore 
focus on the use of these techniques in the description of Soar [ 23,31.40]. Soar is 
appropriate for our discussion because it has been described in natural language, as a 
computer program in procedural terms (LISP and C programs exist for various versions 
of the theory), and in the formal specification language Z [27]. However, whilst we 
concentrate in this section on the current forms of articulation of Soar, our comments 
apply equally to the methods used in the description of most other relatively well- 
developed cognitive theories (e.g., ACT* [ 21, Mental Models [ 201, etc.). 
Soar is an information processing mechanism which is specialised to adaptively raise 
and resolve goals by exploiting a body of knowledge. The Soar architecture is based 
upon the well-established approach to modelling problem solving as search in a problem 
space [ 341. Soar implements its search by cyclically retrieving knowledge relevant to 
its current goal (the elaboration phase), and making decisions about the results (the 
decision phase). Speaking loosely, decisions are made about the knowledge to use in 
resolving goals, the interpretations to assign to data, and the actions to carry out. If 
Soar has sufficient knowledge in a particular context the goal will be solved directly. If 
its knowledge does not embody a solution it will automatically generate a new goal to 
resolve the impasse and recursively attempt to solve that. If the subgoal succeeds, the 
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impasse is resolved and the result becomes available in the parent goal context. While 
problem solving within a subgoal the architecture is able to identify critical contextual 
data and learn this as new knowledge for future use. 
2.1.1. Natural language and diagrammatic descriptions 
There are many natural language descriptions of Soar in the literature (see, e.g., [23, 
3 1,401)) often accompanied by diagrams. Such descriptions are generally abstract. They 
tend to present Soar as an information processing psychological theory, and in so doing 
employ the language and techniques of that field. The advantage of such descriptions is 
that they allow the theory to be stated at an appropriate level of abstraction and do not 
force theorists into describing unnecessary details. Soar, for example, embodies a set of 
preference rules for making certain choices during decision making; we may regard the 
existence of such rules as part of the essential Soar theory, but be non-committal about 
the precise mechanism by which the rules are applied. This is a perfectly acceptable 
position if the details of the mechanism are to be regarded as questions for future 
research, or if they are in principle undecidable. 
Natural language descriptions, however, have severe disadvantages. They are poten- 
tially ambiguous and of limited precision. This can hinder the derivation of unequivocal 
predictions. Furthermore, in being abstract, natural language descriptions allow the de- 
tails of a theory to be filled in in an indefinite number of ways. If such variation does 
not affect the higher-level properties of the theory, then this may not be of concern, 
but as Hunt and Lute point out, with reference to the longest, and presumably most 
detailed, natural language/diagrammatic description of Soar, “Newell’s description of 
Soar is not detailed enough to ensure that any two programmers, having read the book, 
would produce computationally equivalent programs” [ 18, p. 4481. 
2.1.2. Procedural descriptions 
Many current psychological theories are highly complex, with the explanations they 
offer involving the interaction of several components or functional modules. As a result, 
computational instantiations of theories are often vital in establishing a theory’s predic- 
tions. Soar is no different in this regard, and the Soar community draws heavily on the 
behaviour of the Soar implementation when attempting to demonstrate how the theory 
accounts for empirical results. However, if a program is viewed as a unitary theoretical 
statement in this way then presumably all of its components and processes must be 
treated as having equal theoretical status. This seems unsatisfactory. In the case of Soar, 
for example, there are many features of the program which do not seem to have much 
theoretical force, such as: 
( 1) The particular algorithms for matching and firing production rules and remov- 
ing working memory elements during processing. These are designed primarily 
for efficient operation on conventional computers. If the Soar architecture is 
“correct”, does the neural implementation also embody these algorithms? 
(2) The choice of preference semantics for operator selection, which has been fleshed 
out in different ways in different implementations [ 22-24,3 1 I. It is not clear 
that any of these formulations is superior, and this is clearly an aspect of the 
theory which is somewhat fluid. Little seems to hang on the details of different 
choices. Indeed it is unclear what sort of evidence could distinguish between 
different possible semantics. It seems hasty and possibly unnecessary to claim 
that any particular preference semantics is part of the Soar theory, even if some 
preference semantics is necessary for simulation purposes. 
( 3 ) The generalised production language, which allows complex operations (such 
as input. output and arithmetic) to be triggered directly by productions, rather 
than, for example, input and output being governed by specialised sensor/effecter 
mechanisms and arithmetic being the product of more primitive processing (as 
apparently required by the cognitive theory [ 3 I] 1. 
These points highlight the most important difficulty with equating a program with a 
theory: if details are required solely to achieve a complete, executable implementation of 
the theory then those details may have unpredictable influences on the implementation’s 
behaviour, obscure the essential claims of the theory, and compromise the intentions of 
the theorist, Given this, any claimed predictions of the theory made on the basis of the 
implementation must be open to debate, as must the claim that an implementation makes 
the theory testable. Again, this is a point touched upon by Hunt and Lute: “we want to 
know whether the simulation was achieved by those parts of the program that embody 
psychological theory or by parts regarded as choices of convenience in programming” 
[ IX. p. 4481. 
A further concern with procedural descriptions of theories as complex as Soar is that 
it is difficult for those not directly involved with the theory’s design and implementation 
to contemplate the theory as a whole or to modify (or even isolate) those parts which 
correspond to specific theoretical assumptions ( cf. [ lo] ). In the case of Soar, which now 
runs to several Megabytes of C code. it is not possible for outsiders who accept most, 
but not all, of the underlying theoretical assumptions to investigate Soar-like theories 
by isolating, and systematically modifying. the computational realisation of particular 
assumptions. 
2.1.3. Declarative specijications 
A third description method that has been used by the Soar community is the formal 
specification of the program in the language Z. This is a mathematical anguage, based 
on first-order logic, which was designed to provide clear descriptions of what a program 
should do under what circumstances independent of technology-specific details and to 
permit formal verification of its correctness [ 441. Roughly, a program is decomposed 
into a hierarchy of operations. each of which is then described in terms of the conditions 
that must hold before the operation can be executed and the conditions which must hold 
after execution. A Z specification is not itself an executable program, but rather a 
clear statement of the required behaviour of the program separate from any specific 
implementation. In principle, then, it is a description of a theory about which one can 
reason without worrying about whether it is implemented as a procedural program (e.g.. 
in LISP or C), a piece of hardware, or as nervous tissue. 
The purpose of the Z specification of Soar [ 271 was primarily to provide a sound basis 
for engineering Soar qua computer program rather than Soar qua psychological theory. 
The Z formalisation specifies everything that is necessary for an executable version of 
Soar. It is not a description at the level of abstraction appropriate for clearly stating 
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the underlying cognitive theory. Consequently, as with the procedural implementations, 
the Z specification makes no distinction between the essential theoretical elements and 
processes which appear to be matters of implementation detail (such as those features 
noted above). If a Z specification of Soar were developed which attempted to capture 
the psychological theory, it may be possible to make such a distinction, although Z itself 
does not provide explicit support for it. 
2.2. Requirements for a theory specification technique 
The methods of theory description surveyed above fail in different ways. Natural 
language and diagrammatic descriptions allow theories to be stated at the appropriate 
level of abstraction, but are imprecise. Procedural descriptions are precise, but do not 
abstract away from implementation details, conflating the theory with its implementation. 
Formal specification languages may do better, but existing specification languages do 
not explicitly support the theory/implementation distinction. From these failings we 
may distill four requirements for a theory specification technique: clarity, succinctness, 
executability, and theory/implementation separation. 
Clarity is required in order to avoid the interpretation/ambiguity problems of natural 
language and so that theorists may isolate theoretical assumptions. Succinctness also 
aids the isolation of theoretical assumptions: excessive verbosity is as harmful to clarity 
as an obscure notation. The case for executability is established by the complexity of 
current theories, and the difficulties that such complexity present for anyone attempting 
to derive predictions directly from a specification of a theory. As noted above, it is in 
general only through simulation that the complex behaviour of a number of interacting 
assumptions can be determined. Finally, the separation of theory and implementation 
detail is required if the complex behaviour displayed by an executable theory is to be 
correctly attributed to theoretical, and not implementational, aspects of the specification. 
We refer to this separation as the above-the-line/below-the-line (or AIB) division, with 
theoretically motivated aspects being located above the line and implementation details 
located below the line. 
2.3. Executable speci$cation languages for cognitive modelling 
We believe that the failings of current articulation methods can in part be addressed by 
the development of an appropriate executable specification language. By this we mean 
a language which may be used to specify a theory in a sense to be elaborated below yet 
which may also be animated; once specified the model can be executed to check that 
its behaviour is indeed that which it is claimed to be. Such a language must be precise 
(a specification language can tolerate no ambiguity) but, where necessary, it should 
allow one to escape from algorithmic details, specifying what a process does rather 
than the mechanical details of how it is done. Critically, the language must support the 
distinction between theory and implementation detail and it is for this reason that the 
formal specification language Z is inappropriate. 
Given the current usage of formal specification languages in computer science, our 
use of the phrase “executable specification language” requires some elaboration. Van 
Harmelen and Balder [45] summarise the purposes of forma1 specification languages 
as: 
l the removal of ambiguity. 
l facilitation of communication and discussion, 
l the ability to derive properties of the design in the absence of an implementation. 
While we claim that the work presented below demonstrates that the particular executable 
specification language we have employed has considerable virtues in respect of the first 
two points, it is not intended to address the third. The aims of psychologists attempting to 
construct computational models do not include the mathematical verification of software. 
We view executable specification languages as describing how a cognitive theory will 
behave, not as prescribing how it ought to behave. As argued above, properties which 
seem of greater relevance to the cognitive scientist are clarity, succinctness, executability, 
and support for theoretical abstraction. 
2.4. A lB decompositiorl 
Executability is essential if the behaviour of complex theories is to be determined, but 
it has its price. As noted in Section 2.1.2, there are typically many aspects of a cognitive 
theory whose precise implementation is not relevant to the theory. As such it has been 
claimed that it is not helpful to implement cognitive theories in this way. In brief, 
the argument is that executability requires over-specification: the specification of details 
beyond the scope of the theory. According to this argument, the precise specification 
of such irrelevant details would only conflate the theory with its implementation and 
obscure theoretically important aspects. The problem with this argument, of course, is 
that the core theory itself makes no formal predictions. Typically predictions are made 
intuitively. However, a careful examination reveals that the point at issue is not one 
of specifying the irrelevant details of a theory, which executability requires we must 
do. it is one of keeping implementation details distinct from theoretically motivated 
aspects. Once implementation details are admitted (but kept distinct from the theory) 
qualified predictions can be drawn. This is the idea of AIB decomposition: to draw 
a clear distinction between essential theory and implementation details, thus allowing 
predictions to be properly drawn. 
Now, if implementation details are truly irrelevant, then any implementation of those 
details should be adequate. Thus, a theorist may give an input/output specification 
of some functional subcomponent without specifying the details of the algorithms or 
mechanisms which compute the function. From the point of view of the implementation. 
the subcomponent might just as well be implemented as a look-up table (subject to 
finiteness considerations). More commonly, the theorist may merely state constraints on 
outputs given certain inputs, without those constraints necessarily determining a unique 
output. 
Johnson-Laird illustrates this second approach in the context of his theory of syl- 
logistic reasoning [20]. According to this theory, people construct “mental models” 
of propositions (such as some beekeepers are not chemists). These models consist of 
tokens representing the terms in the proposition, but “the number of tokens [. . .] is 
arbitrary” [20, p. 971. and “a crucial point about mental models is that the system for 
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constructing and interpreting them must embody knowledge that the number of entities 
depicted is irrelevant to any [. . .] inference that is drawn” [ 20, p. 981. So the system 
which Johnson-Laird proposes for constructing mental models is constrained, but not 
totally specified. It does not specify how many tokens will be present in any particular 
model. This style of theorising is valid, provided that the constraints on irrelevant details 
are articulated with sufficient precision to be testable. 
The A/B distinction yields a procedure for testing, via variation below the line, the 
sensitivity of behaviour to implementation detail, and, therefore, the degree to which 
aspects claimed to be a matter of implementation are truly irrelevant. Only if behaviour 
(or those aspects of behaviour under investigation) can be shown to be invariant over 
a range of alternate implementations of B assumptions, can those assumptions truly be 
described as implementation details. AIB decomposition effectively delineates a space of 
related models which share their A component and allows that space to be systematically 
explored. Such investigations reveal the degree to which high-level assumptions dictate 
low-level behaviour. 
Hinton and Shallice [ 171 and Plaut and Shallice [38] have explicitly used this 
approach in the connectionist simulation of the neuropsychological syndrome deep 
dyslexia. This work involved the characterisation of a space of systems and input/output 
representations in terms of four general conditions. It was then postulated that the be- 
haviour of any system in the space, when damaged, would have a number of properties, 
which in fact correspond to those found empirically in the syndrome. A number of 
specific systems, learning algorithms, and input/output representations which were in 
different regions of the space were then implemented and it was shown that they gen- 
erally exhibited the hypothesised properties when damaged. ’ Thus, by varying various 
details, Hinton, Plaut and Shallice demonstrated that certain aspects of their model could 
justifiably be classified as implementation details.’ 
It should be clear that the AIB distinction cannot be imposed on an implementation 
a priori. The onus is on the theoretician to declare those aspects of an implementa- 
tion which are theoretically motivated (A) and those which are implementation details 
(B). The proportion of A to B in different theories will vary, and theory evolution 
may well involve the incorporation of aspects previously realised as implementation 
details into the A component. Nevertheless, the proper application of the AIB dis- 
tinction, when embedded within a philosophy of science that endorses falsification, 
requires that aspects of an implementation which are in principle undecidable cannot 
be regarded as theoretically motivated. In this sense the AIB distinction embodies a 
hypothesis generating strategy: all aspects of the A component must be empirically 
testable. Thus, to justify being an A component, an aspect must be critical to the 
t One of the behaviours initially assumed to be generally predicted as a property of any model defined 
by the four basic assumptions was actually found to occur only as a result of certain of the below-the- 
line implementations. It was that the frequency of so-called “mixed errors”-rrors which are similar to 
the stimulus on more than one dimension-is higher than one would expect given the frequencies of errors 
which resemble the stimulus on a single dimension only. Thus the four basic assumptions corresponded to 
above-the-line assumptions for only the more global of the behaviours of the model. 
2 Applying the same logic to variations in the preference semantics of Soar (as outlined in Section 2.1.2), 
suggests that the details of Soar’s preference evaluation arc also more a matter of implementation than theory. 
behaviour of the model as a whole. with variation of the aspect yielding empirically 
measurable differences in behaviour. The AIB decomposition technique therefore allows 
us not only to explore supposedly non-significant variant theories within the constraints 
of a single above-the-line theory, but also to explore related theories within the con- 
straints of related above-the-line specifications. Section 4.3 gives an example of this 
approach 
We may summarise the above-the-line/below-the-line distinction in the following way. 
Above-the-line assumptions are theoretically motivated. They should have the following 
“criticality” properties: 
( I ) falsifiability: failure of the program to predict the observed behaviour should 
indicate the falsity of one or more of the A assumptions; and 
(2 ) uniqueness: distinct A assumptions should predict distinct behaviours. 
In contrast, below-the-line details are not theoretically motivated. Their effect on be- 
haviour should be subject to the following “sensitivity” properties: 
( I ) invariance: changes to the B details should have no effect on the behaviour of 
the program; and 
( 2 ) non-compensatability: it should not be possible to compensate for failures of the 
A assumptions by adjustment of the B details. 
In other words. behaviour should bc robust with respect to variation of B details but 
brittle with respect to variation of A assumptions. 
The properties of criticality and sensitivity are idealisations: in reality they cannot be 
categorical. In practice it may bc more appropriate to develop indices of criticality and 
sensitivity so as to quantify the contribution of A and B components to the behaviour 
of a program. Such an approach has at least two advantages. Firstly. it would allow 
the sufficiency of competing theories to be compared-a theory with a higher critical- 
ity/sensitivity ratio may be regarded as superior to one with a lower ratio given that the 
theories address the same data. Secondly. it would allow the progress of a research pro- 
gramme to be quantified, with theoretical advances being measured in terms of increases 
in the criticality/sensitivity ratio. 
3. Sceptic: an example executable specification language 
The particular executable specitication language which we have been working with 
is Sceptic [ 9, 161. Sceptic was designed to combine the capabilities of an executable 
specification language with capabilities that would facilitate the practical implementation 
of various simulation and AI applications. Though it was not explicitly designed as a 
cognitive modelling language, its design was loosely infuenced by earlier modelling 
work using production rule systems. It was considered as a first approximation to the 
required modelling tool for several reasons: 
(a) It had been found to have properties appropriate to the implementation of com- 
plex. time-evolving systems ( including biological process simulations [ 481 and 
logical reasoning mechanisms [ 161 ), autonomous systems [ 141, planning sys- 
tems [36] and control processes in image interpretation and medical problem 
solving [ 461. 
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(b) The language interpreter supports a number of mechanisms that are commonly 
assumed in cognitive theories, including pattern-directed processing, content ad- 
dressable memory retrieval/update, sequential processing and parallel data prop- 
agation modes. 
(c) It has a simple but expressive syntax which assists clear and succinct represen- 
tation of data structures and processes, and its execution model is simple and 
easily described. 
3.1. The Sceptic language 
Sceptic was originally formulated as an extension to Prolog (e.g., [6] ), in which it 
is implemented. The primary additional device is a forward chaining control structure 
(the conditional rewrite rule). Crucially from the perspective of cognitive modelling, 
this control structure allows procedural control aspects of a program to be expressed 
in terms of rewrite rules and distinguished from purely declarative aspects expressed in 
standard Prolog. 
Central to any Sceptic program is a database-the system’s state-which is queried 
and modified as execution progresses. Rewrite rules test the state and, on the basis 
of such tests, either modify the state or trigger further rewrite rules. A Sceptic pro- 
gram consists of a specification of an initial state and a set of rules which specify 
how the state evolves over time, or how the state changes in response to particular 
events. 
3.1.1. Syntax 
Sceptic inherits much of its syntax from Prolog. All data is represented via Prolog 
terms, which consist of a relation and zero or more parameters, e.g.: 
block1 augmentation(block1, colour=red) production(p&q, r) 
The last example above, production(p&q, r), might represent a production rule, with 
the arguments p&q representing antecedent matches against working memory (p and q) 
and r representing the consequent creation of a working memory element. 
Conditional rewrite rules have the following syntax: 
InTrigger: 
Conditionl, . . . . ConditionM 
=> OutTriggerl, . . . . OutTriggerN. 
InTrigger, Conditions and OutTriggers are all Prolog terms, possibly containing 
parameters in the form of Prolog variables (indicated as capitalised strings: 
augmentation( Obj ect , Attribute=Value), for example, contains three variables). 
Two types of condition may be distinguished. Firstly, there are those which test 
whether or not some condition holds in the current program state. We refer to these as 
state testers. Secondly, there are generators-conditions which instantiate variables by 
querying the state, thus generating information. We also distinguish two types of trigger: 
atomic triggers, which are non-decomposable, built-in, operations such as output primi- 
tives and database modihcation primitives; and compound triggers, which are defined in 
terms of conditional rewrite rules. 
The execution of a Sceptic program is governed by a stack which holds all unprocessed 
triggers. Execution is initiated when a trigger pattern is issued at the Sceptic prompt. 
This pattern is pushed onto the stack. which is then processed item by item. As each 
item is taken off the stack it generates a trigger event. If a trigger event is a primitive 
operation ( c.g.. a primitive database modification) then it is executed directly. Otherwise 
it is expanded. If all the conditions of a Sccptic rule (on the left-hand side of the rewrite 
symbol, =>) are satisfied at the moment a Trigger event occurs then all the elements 
on the right-hand side are generated as the expansion of the trigger and pushed onto 
the stack. Execution of a Sccptic program therefore consists of an indefinite number of 
cycles (trigger event. check conditions. process actions) which continues until the stack 
is empty. 
Sccptic variables arc hound by ussignin g values during the triggering step or when 
checking Ic0-hand side conditions. Such conditions may either match an explicitly stored 
term. in which case the variables simply take the values of the constants in the same 
position of the matching term. or generate values from the program state. Right-hand side 
variables take the values of any variables to the left of the rewrite symbol which have 
the same name. Variables in the conditions of rewrite rules arc universally quantified so 
that if Sceptic can find multiple solutions for such conditions, multiple copies of actions 
will bc pushed onto the slack with appropriate variable bindings. 
To illustrate. in the following Sceptic rule: 
timeClime) : 
input_buffer(Object, Att=Value) 
=> add_wm(Time,Object, Att=Value). 
a timestamped data item is added to working memory whenever a time event occurs 
(e.g., a clock ticks) and there are data in an input channel. If II items are in the input 
buffer when the time trigger occurs then II add_wm items will be created and pushed 
onto Sceptic’s stack. 
As noted above. Sceptic was originally developed as an extension to Prolog, and 
employs built-in Prolog operations to check and update the program state. carry out 
input/output operations, etc. However, this is not considered to be fundamental. These 
operations could be implemented with any general programming language, by specialised 
hardware, or even perhaps by a distributed, subsymbolic mechanism. The essential 
aspects of Sceptic are the conditional rewrite rule and the division this engenders between 
conditions and actions. 
Imagine we are constructing a cognitive theory, call this Cocl. COG1 is a rather 
simple theory. though perhaps it captures a motif common to many real psychological 
theories of twenty or so years ago. Cool can be described in English as follows: 




> Planning * 
Motor 
System 
Fig. I. A box and arrow diagram of COG 1. 
Information enters a central cognitive system through a perceptual mechanism, from 
where it is passed to a central processing channel in which actions are planned and 
executed. Since certain kinds of sensory information must be processed urgently, 
however, there is a “fast” link, between the perceptual mechanism and the action 
execution mechanism, which operates in parallel with the limited capacity central 
channel. 
Cool might have been presented by a theorist in a box and arrow notation, such 
as that in Fig. 1. In the box and arrow notation boxes are typically used to represent 
hypothesised functional modules, and links between the boxes represent the flow of data 
or control information between modules. Of course the box and arrow notation does 
not represent the whole of the intended theory, just an abstraction in which the detailed 
mechanisms of the modules and communication channels are disregarded. They are not 
considered to be part of the theory at this level of description. 










The example illustrates two points about the structure of a Sceptic specification. Firstly, 
each rewrite rule corresponds to one arrow in the box and arrow specification. The first 
rewrite rule, for example, corresponds to the arrow from the perceptual mechanism to the 
central planning system. Secondly, the three triggers employed (perceptual_event, 
constructand-executeplan and executemotor-plan) correspond to the three 
boxes. With regard to processing, when a triggering event occurs (e.g., when, in Cocl, 
there is a perceptual event), the conditions of all corresponding rules are evaluated 
in parallel against the state of the system. If the conditions evaluate to true, then the 
consequent triggering events are generated in series, resulting in a further burst of 
processing. Consequent triggers may also modify the system’s state. 
Not shown above are the details of the antecedent conditions. These may be specified 
in standard Prolog. In particular. if the domain is restricted, each valid instance may 
simply be listed. Note that such conditions are not detailed in the box and arrow diagram, 
though they are necessary if the theory is to be animated. 
This example also shows some of the expressive power of rewrite rules. Although 
it may not be immediately obvious. conditional rewrite rules can directly encode all 
standard control structures. The rules for perceptual-event demonstrate how a stan- 
dard “if then . else _” structure may be represented. All standard loop control 
structures may be implemented by recursive rewrite rules: rewrite rules whose trigger 
appears on their right-hand sides, i.e.. rewrite rules which trigger themselves. Further- 
more, because variables in conditions arc implicitly universally quantified, and because 
all instantiations of the conditions of any trigger are evaluated with a constant state. 
the rules embody a form of parallelism: central-planning may yield multiple actions 
for any given event. These will be executed sequentially in the order they are pushed 
onto the stack. but the evaluation of what actions to perform is effectively performed in 
parallel. 
It was noted above that the structure of the Sceptic specitication of COCJ~ mirrored 
the box and arrow diagram, although the details internal to the boxes were not supplied. 
Given that such details were not specified in the original statement of the theory. 
the Sceptic specification accurately captures the theory at the box and arrow level, 
i.e.. at the level of psychological theorising. Details of the two generating conditions, 
perceptual-event and CentralPlanning are necessary if the specification is to be 
executed, but they arc not part of the psychological theory. In this way, Sceptic is able 
to support the theory/implementation division via syntactically and semantically distinct 
structures within the language: abovethe-line mechanisms may naturally be expressed 
in terms of conditional rewrite rules, with below-the-line detail being expressed in terms 
of Prolog predicate definitions. 
The USC of Prolog predicate definitions to specify the conditions under which Sceptic 
rewrite rules are triggered is not. as noted above, an essential part of Sceptic. Neverthe- 
less. Prolog, when interpreted as a logic programming language in the strongest sense, is 
particularly apt here, as it allows a purely declarative statement of implementation detail: 
below-the-line aspects may be stated in terms of constraints that must hold, rather than 
as a set of algorithms. This avoids any possibility of attributing algorithmic properties 
to implementation detail, mirroring the fact that the implementation in algorithmic terms 
of below-the-line aspects is, by definition, beyond the bounds of theory. 
4. An assessment of Sceptic 
Our goal is to develop a specification language in which definitions of models are 
readable and succinct, modular, appropriately abstract, and yet still executable. In order 
to evaluate Sceptic in these respects we now present (a) a complete reconstruction 
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of Soar 4, demonstrating the expressive power of Sceptic; (b) an overview of Sceptic 
specifications of a number of other theories, demonstrating the generality of Sceptic; and 
(c) details of several computational experiments performed with the Sceptic specification 
of Soar 4, demonstrating empirical methodology based on the A]B distinction used with 
Sceptic. 
4.1. The Sceptic reconstruction of Soar 
The toy psychological model above illustrates the basic concepts of Sceptic, but to 
evaluate the language on a more challenging example we have reconstructed a ver- 
sion of the Soar architecture. Soar was chosen for this purpose for several reasons. 
Firstly, in many respects Soar is, at the present time, the most established and mature 
computational theory within the symbolic paradigm. Secondly, Soar represents a major 
challenge to the development of a cognitive modelling methodology because of the 
range of phenomena it addresses and the technical complexity of the program. Soar is 
the product of more than a third of a century of research, beginning with a narrow focus 
in problem solving [ 331, and progressing to an “architecture for general intelligence” 
[ 231, and even a “unified theory of cognition” [ 3 11. Finally, the Soar program has 
been distributed to many research groups who are investigating and contributing to the 
Soar theory; a deeper understanding of the theory is therefore more widely disseminated 
than for most computational models. Version 4 of Soar was chosen because this is the 
version addressed by most existing verbal descriptions (e.g., [ 23,3 l] ). In addition it 
is sufficiently complex to illustrate the use of Sceptic, and, as argued by Cooper and 
Shallice [lo], it is not clear that the additional complexities present in later versions 
have any deep psychological motivation. 
Irrespective of Sceptic’s precise status as a general executable specification language, 
it is suitable as an implementation language for Soar and similar cognitive theories for 
several independent reasons. Firstly, the language incorporates Prolog’s pattern matching 
capabilities. Analogous capabilities are implicated in Soar and many other current theo- 
ries of cognitive processes. A second feature of Sceptic is its functional parallelism. The 
division between conditions and actions allows all conditions relating to the expansion of 
any trigger to be effectively evaluated in parallel. This is particularly useful in specifying 
Soar’s elaboration phase, which involves many functionally parallel activities. Thirdly, 
and perhaps most appropriately for Soar, Sceptic’s conditional rewrite rules bear a close 
resemblance to the productions which form the basis of Soar’s elaboration cycle. 
Within the Sceptic specification of Soar each of the main components (elaboration, 
decision, subgoaling and chunking) is specified in terms of a set of Sceptic rules. The 
complete set of these rules is contained in Appendix A. The trigger of each rule is used 
to represent the communication between the components. The conditions of the rules 
test the state of the Soar system, notable working memory, preference memory, and so 
forth. When certain states are found to hold the actions of the rules are executed. These 
actions implement both direct alterations to the state of the system, such as additions to 
working memory, and the sending of messages to other system modules by means of 
triggers. Where the literature on Soar warrants it (i.e., it is clear that the internal steps 
of the component’s operation are part of the psychological theory embodied in Soar) 
the internal structure of the component is implemented above the line by introducing a 
collection of Sceptic rules which specify the internal details of the component. When 
there appears to be no theoretical justification for elaborating the operations in detail no 
such decomposition is attempted-they are left below the line. 
Our aim in focusing on Soar was not simply to reimplement it, but to rationally 
reconstruct it. This was successful in that by using trace functions which duplicate the 
surface form of the original Soar’s output we have been able to demonstrate that, on 
published examples, the behaviour of the Sceptic version is identical to the original. 
However, because of the emphasis on rational reconstruction, there are certain aspects 
of the Sceptic version which are not merely reimplementations of the corresponding 
aspects of the LISP implementations. Firstly, the decision phase is decomposed into 
two separate processes, one of deciding upon a certain context element and one of 
bookkeeping. Secondly, the reconstruction highlights architectural differences behind 
the classification of impasse types. In our view these differences actually increase the 
clarity of the theory’s structure whilst preserving its behaviour. 
Of some interest from the methodological point of view is that comparison of the 
LISP and Sceptic versions of Soar 3 shows that Sceptic Soar (including both A and 
B components) is less than 10%~ of the size of the LISP version measured in lines 
of code. This difference cannot be entirely attributed to the expressive capabilities 
of Sceptic-the Sceptic version does not include theoretically irrelevant algorithms 
(such as the RETE algorithm for efficiently firing productions), nor does it include 
many of the interface facilities designed to make the LISP implementations more user- 
friendly. We have not attempted to duplicate such features, since our goal is only to 
include those theoretically significant features of the program together with just those 
below-the-line mechanisms which have to be implemented to make the program ex- 
ccutable. Nevertheless, the reduction in size does demonstrate that all that is neces- 
sary for an executable statement of the theory can be given in substantially reduced 
terms. 
Although the complete implementation is substantially reduced in size, at 2000 lines 
of code it is still a substantial program. It is hardly a succinct representation of the 
Soar theory, and this has obvious implications for difficulty of understanding by those 
other than the authors. However. the AIB distinction serves us well here. The A code 
consists of only 28 Sceptic rules. If we accept the AIB decomposition and equate the 
essential Soar 4 theory (see [ 32, p. 4671) with the above-the-line rewrite rules, then 
this represents a dramatic reduction in complexity. Notwithstanding the minor differences 
between the two programs noted above, we consider this reduction to be important. The 
relative ease of understanding of triggered condition-action rules, as compared with 
arbitrary programs, also contributes to clarity. The Sceptic program, and hence the 
underlying model, is in our view much easier to understand, criticise, assess and modify 
than a program written in a conventional programming language. 
Furthermore, paralleling the Sceptic specification of Cool, there is also significant 
modularity. Individual Sceptic rules capture the functionality of individual components 
of the Soar architecture. The rules can be modified to yield different behaviour without 
requiring changes to other parts of the program, though of course such changes cannot 
be arbitrary and must be made with care and attention to the data and control structure 
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of the global program. The extent of the modularity of the Soar specification, and some 
of the consequent benefits, are illustrated by the computational experiments discussed in 
Section 4.3. 
4.2. The generality of Sceptic 
Even if our optimistic conclusions based on our reconstruction of Soar are justified, 
one may reasonably ask to what extent Sceptic embodies a general method, and to what 
extent the benefits may reflect merely a good match between the needs of the Soar 
architecture and the capabilities of Sceptic. Other work suggests that this is not the case. 
A variety of cognitive theories have been implemented using Sceptic, including Johnson- 
Laird’s theory of model-based reasoning [ 201, Morton et al.‘s “Headed Records” theory 
of memory structure and recall [28], Sloman’s model of motives and emotions [43], 
Barnard’s theory of Interacting Cognitive Subsystems [4] and Norman and Shallice’s 
model of automatic action control [ 351. 
Johnson-Laird’s model-based theory of human syllogistic reasoning [20] is essen- 
tially an algorithmic one, specifying a number of processes claimed to be involved 
in syllogistic reasoning. These processes include building a model which satisfies a 
pair of premises, inspecting a model for a putative conclusion, attempting to refute 
a conclusion by manipulating a model, etc. The theory has previously been imple- 
mented in LISP, and, at an abstract level, is well specified in the literature. The 
aim of the Sceptic specification [7] was primarily to provide an executable ver- 
sion of the theory which separated theoretical statements and implementation details. 
This was achieved by associating one Sceptic trigger with each process described by 
Johnson-Laird, and directly translating the LISP implementation of the remainder of 
the model into Prolog generators and state testers. The resulting implementation repli- 
cated the behaviour of the LISP implementation on all 64 configurations of syllogism 
premises. 
A further processing theory for which a Sceptic specification has been developed is 
Morton et al.‘s Headed Records theory of memory structure and recall [ 281. This theory 
claims that memory is structured in terms of a set of discrete records, with each record 
consisting of a heading consisting of a set of access cues and a body containing the 
content of the memory. Recall of any particular record may involve a sequence of recall 
cycles where an inappropriate record is accessed and its content is used, together with 
external cues, to construct a new key for a further recall cycle. This theory, though not 
previously implemented, was well described in the literature and proved to be directly 
implementable in Sceptic. The A component of the complete recall cycle was coded with 
just five triggers, corresponding to the five principal processes: create cue set; search 
record heading; retrieve matching record; evaluate retrieved record; and extend cue set. 
Eight conditions were necessary to encode the B component. 
A very different style of theory is represented by Sloman’s theory of motive process- 
ing [43]. This theory concerns the scheduling and attempted satisfaction of multiple, 
possibly conflicting, goals, and consists of a number of parallel communicating pro- 
cesses. Such interacting processes can be modelled in Sceptic in terms of transition 
rules for a single global database, where the database elements represent the data on 
which the interacting processes operate [X] This data-flow style of specification is very 
different from the control-flow style adopted for Soar, syllogistic reasoning, and mem- 
ory recall, where the how of control is specified in terms of Sceptic rewrite rules. In 
particular, the data-flow style is purely declarative, more closely approximating formal 
specification. The specification of Sloman’s motive processing architecture includes just 
three rewrite rules: one to add new database elements: one to transform current database 
elements; and one to delete database elements. Each rule has numerous instantiations. 
Thus. for example, one instantiation of the transform rule states the conditions under 
which a suspended motive will become active, while another instantiation specifies the 
reverse transformation. The three rules can he viewed as an engine for executing the 
actual specification which is given in fully declarative Prolog. This specification also 
scores well in terms of clarity, succinctness and modularity. In addition, the AIB distinc- 
tion is manifest in the separation between instantiations of rewrite rules and the Prolog 
conditions on which they draw. 
A second data-flow theory which has been explored is Barnard’s cognitive architecture 
based on Interacting Cognitive Subsystems [4]. Again this is a theory which models 
cognition in terms of several interacting processes, and again the Sceptic specification 
is driven by just three rewrite rules. In fact, the same three rewrite rules were used 
to harness both Sloman’s motive processing theory and Barnard’s Interacting Cognitive 
Subsystems. Full details of all instantiations of the rules for Barnard’s system have not 
been developed, but exploratory work suggests that the specification style applied to 
Sloman’s motive processing model generalises to a class of theories based on concurrent 
asynchronous communicating processes. 
Lastly, Sceptic has been applied to Norman and Shallice’s Contention Scheduling 
theory of action selection [ 3.51. This concerns the sequencing of actions and the se- 
lection of objects involved in those actions within segments of automatic or well-learnt 
behaviour, such as preparing breakfast or driving a car along a familiar route. The 
heart of the theory is an interacting activation network of schemata or action segments. 
The theory differs substantially from those above in that it includes continuous valued 
variables representing the activation levels of schemata. Nevertheless, Sceptic has again 
proved capable of accommodating the theory both clearly and succinctly [ 111. The style 
of specification follows that used for the theories of Sloman and Barnard, specifying 
database elements and rules for generating/updating/deleting those elements. The con- 
tinuous valued variables are treated as one further component of the database elements, 
with the updated values being calculated from the current values according to standard 
interacting activation difference equations. 
The size of the Sceptic implementation of Soar, together with that of each of the 
above theories, is shown in Table I. Whilst the figures can only be taken as giv- 
ing an approximate guide to the complexity of the implementations, it is clear that 
all implementations arc concise. though Motive Processing, Contention Scheduling 
and Interacting Cognitive Subsystems require further domain-specific code to be ex- 
ecuted. 
One obvious class of theories for which the approach does not seem directly useful 
is distributed or connectionist theories. A highly symbolic approach is obviously inap- 
propriate for implementing a subsymbolic theory but Sceptic may still have utility in 
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Table I 
The size of various Sceptic implementations 
A: rewrite rules B: conditions 
Soar (Version 4) 28 109 
Mental Models 8 50 
Headed Record Recall 5 8 
Motive Processing 20 15 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 3 4 
Contention Scheduling 11 46 
exploring hybrid models by implementing symbolic components as Sceptic rules, and 
the subsymbolic components as below-the-line procedures. This has been done in an 
exploratory study of medical diagnosis [ 131. A back-propagation network was trained 
using a collection of records of patients with different diseases presenting with different 
sets of symptoms. The net learned a discriminating set of weights in the usual way. 
Another below-the-line procedure monitored the behaviour of the net and generated 
symbolic rules which were stored by a Sceptic program. As new cases led to weight 
revisions new or different rules were generated. The Sceptic component maintained a 
consistent set of rules using a simple truth maintenance mechanism [ 161. 
Our conclusion is that the implemented theories encompass a wide range of theoret- 
ical traditions and the relative ease of implementation suggests that the approach has 
considerable generality. 
4.3. Sceptic as an experimental tool 
In Section 2.4 we argued for the utility of sensitivity and criticality analyses in 
evaluating the theoretical and implementational aspects of a model. The clarity and 
succinctness of the Sceptic specification of Soar opens up the possibility of conducting 
such analyses on Soar. In particular, with regard to criticality, we may consider the effect 
of modifying specific theoretical assumptions on the behaviour of the theory as a whole. 
In order to demonstrate the methodology, and to prove the utility of computational 
experiments, we consider here three experiments with the working memory component 
of Soar 4. Each experiment was conducted by modifying the Sceptic implementation 
of Soar 4 and then performing a number of simulations to evaluate the effects of the 
modifications. In order to emphasise that computational experiments are in principle no 
different to other experiments, each is reported in a style similar to that used to report 
more standard experiments. 
4.3.1. Experiment 1: the single state principle 
Rationale: In 1990, the Soar community moved from version 4 to version 5 of their 
architecture. The transition to Soar 5 was motivated primarily by a psychologically 
unrealistic requirement that Soar 4 placed on working memory, namely that the sequence 
of states traversed within a problem space is maintained in working memory until 
the relevant goal is achieved. This aspect of Soar 4 meant that as a problem space 
was traversed, the working memory requirement increased at a virtually constant rate. 
To counter this. Newell [ 311 introduced the single state principle (SSP): within any 
problem space, only a single state is maintained in working memory at any time. In 
Soar 5 this is effected via destructive state modification: as each operator is applied 
the current state is destructively modified to yield a new state. This destructive state 
modification. however, results in enormous complications within Soar. Experiment I 
was designed to demonstrate that a version of the SSP could be incorporated into Soar 4 
without those complications. The idea was that old context elements (i.e.. problem 
spaces, states, and operators) could simply be deleted from working memory when 
they were superseded. This is not destructive state modification-the old state is deleted 
rather than being destructively modified-but it is a version of the SSP. 
Method: The Sceptic specification of Soar 4 (as given in Appendix A) was augmented 
with further rewrite rules which effected the deletion of superseded working memory 
elements whenever a new context element was installed. This situation is complicated by 
the fact that working memory is a form of truth maintenance system, with elements being 
justified by the instantiations of the productions which led to their creation. Therefore, 
when a working memory element was removed, its justification was also removed from 
instantiation memory. The Sceptic rules are as follows: 
install_context_object(Goal, Attribute, NewValue): 
parameter(single_state_principle, true), 
wm_match(augmentation(goal, Goal, Attribute=CurrentValue)) 
=> remove_superseded_wmes(CurrentValue, Goal, Attribute). 




remove_superseded_wmes(Identifier, Goal, Class): 
wme_to_be_removed_after_installation(Identifier, Goal, 
Class, WME) 
generating_instantiation(WME, Instantiation, FiringGoal), 
instantiation_not_supported(Instantiation) 
=> im_remove(Instantiation, FiringGoal). 
The first of these rules is triggered whenever a context object is replaced. It finds the 
current context element by matching against working memory and removes any elements 
connected to this but not connected elsewhere to the context stack. For each such working 
memory element, if the production instantiation responsible for the element’s presence 
in working memory is no longer applicable, it too is removed. 
Simulations were run, both with and without the SSP. on two tasks: the standard 
monkeys and bananas task, as released by CMU with Soar 4.5, and a modified version 
of this task in which the monkey only considers operators whose preconditions are 
satisfied. A trace of decisions made. productions fired, and working memory size, was 
kept for both conditions for each task. 
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Fig. 2. The effect of the single state principle in Soar 4 on the size of working memory 
Results: The graphs in Fig. 2 show the size of working memory versus decision number 
for each of the tasks. In each case the higher curve corresponds to the original Soar 4. 
The lower curves were obtained when the above version of the SSP was incorporated 
into the Sceptic specification. A comparison of the decisions made and productions fired 
revealed that there was no difference in behaviour between the two versions of Soar 4 
on each of the tasks. 
Discussion: There is little difference between the working memory requirements of the 
two versions of Soar on the standard monkeys and bananas task. This is because in this 
task the problem solving behaviour consists primarily of a succession of impasses. Each 
impasse results in a subgoal which requires approximately 30 more working memory 
elements, irrespective of any version of the SSP The difference in working memory 
size is shown most clearly when problem solving is progressing within a single problem 
space, when many decisions involve the selection of a new state after the application 
of an operator. At these times, the working memory requirement of the standard theory 
increases approximately linearly with the number of decisions, whereas the working 
memory requirement of the modified theory remains approximately constant. This can 
be seen most clearly in cycles 10 to 16 and 17 to 24 of the modified monkeys and 
bananas task. The results of the experiment thus question the original rationale for 
Soar 5 since it appears that a viable alternative to destructive state modification exists 
which overcomes the problems of increasing working memory size and yet which is 
substantially simpler than that employed in Soar 5. 
That there was no difference in the sequence of decisions made by Soar 4 with and 
without the SSP would seem to indicate that the SSP is not a critical (i.e., above- 
the-line) assumption. It is only if behaviour is widened to include working memory 
size that criticality can be seen. Given this, it is necessary to show that the working 
memory requirements of Soar 4 with the SSP and Soar 5 are equivalent if we are 
to be sure that the additional complications in implementing the SSP in Soar 5 are 
implementation details. We have been unable to establish this in the absence of an 
executable specification of Soar 5. 
4.3.2. Experiment 2: rcwrkitzg tttetnory &ca~ 
Kutionale: A common assumption within cognitive psychology is that working memory 
is subject to decay or interference. in which there is spontaneous loss of information 
over time (see. e.g., 131 ). Even so. human problem solving is relatively robust. Can 
Soar tolerate reasonable interference or loss from working memory? Experiment 2 was 
designed to explore Soar’s behaviour under conditions of working memory decay. 
Method: The elements of Soar’s working memory are arranged in the form of a con- 
nected, directed , graph. A pilot experiment revealed that, due to the possibility of this 
graph becoming disconnected. unconstrained working memory decay frequently lead 
to serious and irrecoverable problems. Thus. in this experiment decay was restricted to 
terminal working memory elements. This restriction on decay might be justified in terms 
of the peripheral nature of these elements: they are less well integrated into working 
memory, and hencc, more liable to decay. 
The Sceptic specification 01‘ Soar 4 was thus augmented with a further rewrite rule 
which effected a random decay of working memory elements. A parameter specified the 








This rule specifies that a working memory element should be deleted if it is a terminal 
element and if a pseudo-random number between 0 and 1 generated for that working 
memory element is less than the decay parameter. 
The simulation was run 20 times with different random seeds on the two tasks used in 
experiment 1 for values of the decay parameter ranging from 0.000 to 0.010 at intervals 
of 0.001. A decay of 0.001 amounts to a working memory half life of 693 cycles or 42 
seconds at 60 msec per cycle: cf. [ 3 1 1. A decay of 0.010 amounts to a working memory 
half life of 69 cycles or 4.1 seconds at 60 msec per cycle. Execution was terminated if 
the goal was not achieved within 100 decisions. A trace of decisions made, productions 
fired, and working memory elements decayed. was kept for each run. 
Kesults: On analysing the tracts ol‘ each run, two broad sorts of behaviour could be 
distinguished. Either Soar would successfully complete the task, with seemingly perfect 
problem solving (i.e.. choosing exactly the same problem spaces, states and operators 
as when running without working memory decay), or Soar would subgoal apparently 
aimlessly. In the second case, some critical working memory element would often 
eventually decay, resulting in complete breakdown (see below). Fig. 3 shows the number 
of instances of each sort of behaviour. 
The results show two trends. Firstly, as the decay rate increases, the rate of success 
drops off gradually: Soar does not always simply collapse when working memory decay 
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Fig. 3. Behaviour of Soar with decay of working memory leaf elements. 
is introduced. Soar may succeed in short tasks even with some working memory decay. 
This is most clear in the case of the modified monkeys and bananas task, which involves 
only 24 decisions. This task was correctly solved on one trial out of twenty when the 
decay rate was 0.009 per cycle, corresponding to a half life of 4.6 seconds. The effect of 
decay is more pronounced when Soar is attempting longer tasks. The standard monkeys 
and bananas task requires 67 successive correct decisions. Here, substantially less decay 
can be tolerated.’ 
The second trend concerns the number of decisions made before a critical working 
memory element decays, and is revealed most clearly by the standard monkeys and 
bananas task. Though not shown by the graphs, experiment 2 confirms that, as the 
working memory decay rate increases, the number of decisions before such an element 
decays decreases. 
Discussion: It has been shown that Soar can withstand some working memory decay, 
and in this sense it is not entirely brittle. However, with an intermediate decay rate (say 
0.002, giving a working memory half life of 21 seconds) Soar is still generally unable 
to string together 67 decisions, or 4 seconds of behaviour as required by the standard 
monkeys and bananas task. Soar’s behaviour thus appears far more brittle than that of 
the average human. However, the productions employed in these tasks were designed 
to be optimal. They perform no error checking and there is no redundancy in their 
actions. Given that an alternate way of looking at this experiment is as a criticality 
analysis of working memory elements-if very little decay can be tolerated then most 
working memory elements must be critical to the ideal problem solving behaviour- 
3 This reasoning, and the fact that according to the cognitive theory Soar is continuously making decisions and 
does not halt when it completes some task, suggests that the results might be more appropriately presented 
in terms of the mean length of sequences of correct decisions. We have not attempted this here as these 
experiments are intended only as a demonstration of our methodological prescriptions, and the difficulty of 
extracting such information by hand would not be justified. 
we may interpret the results as measuring production redundancy.’ However, building 
redundancy or error detection and recovery into the productions would further increase 
the capacity required of working memory. 
These results raise a general question concerning possible dependencies on imple- 
mentation details. Could details which we have taken to be below the line influence 
Soar’s behaviour when above-the-line assumptions are modified? Unfortunately this ap- 
pears to be the case. Built into the implementation details of the decision cycle are 
various assumptions concerning the structure of working memory. One of these is work- 
ing memory connectedness. This assumption is satisfied by the restriction of decay to 
terminal elements. A second assumption, which may be violated in this experiment, is 
that each goal has a problem space, state. and operator. Because of these implementation 
dependencies, decay of these elements leads to complete breakdown: the decision pro- 
cedure fails if a problem space, state. or operator decays. Presumably it would be more 
desirable for Soar to attempt to redecide any missing elements. This demonstrates the 
importance of being explicit about assumptions built into implementation details. Such 
assumptions amount to constraints on details below the line, without forcing a unique 
below-the-line specification. 
4.3.3. Experiment 2: instantiatiorl memo? deca! 
Rationale: It could be argued that the previous experiment did not correctly take account 
of Soar’s production system base: if a working memory element decays, then the pro- 
duction which originally put the element into working memory can simply fire again, 
replacing the decayed element. Experiment 3 was designed to test if Soar is more robust 
under these conditions, by allowing instantiation memory (the memory which records 
production firings) to decay. 
Method: The Sceptic specification of Soar 4 was augmented with a rewrite rule which 
effected a random decay of instantiation memory elements together with the working 
memory elements which they created. A parameter specified the rate of decay. The rule 
specifies that an instantiation memory element should be deleted if a pseudo-random 
number between 0 and I generated for that instantiation memory element is less than 
the decay rate. If an instantiation memory element is deleted, all working memory 







=> im_remove(Instantiation, FiringGoal), 
remove_dependents(Instantiation). 
This rewrite rule was triggered at the end of each decision cycle. 
‘We thank Richard Young for pointing this out to us 
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a) Standard Monkeys and Baoanas Task b) Modified Monkeys and Bananas Task 
Instantiation Memory Decay m k.~.ss (nonllalj 
Success (delayed) 
Instantiation Memory Decay 
Fig. 4. Behaviour of Soar with instantiation memory decay. 
The simulation was run 20 times (with different random seeds) on the two tasks used 
in experiment 2 for each value of the decay parameter, which again varied from 0.000 
to 0.010 by intervals of 0.001. Execution was terminated if the goal was not achieved 
within 100 decisions. A trace of decisions made, productions fired, and working memory 
elements decayed, was kept for each run. 
Results: The results are summarised in Fig. 4. Once again, performance with memory 
decay falls into a number of broad classes, though interestingly the classes resulting from 
instantiation memory decay differ from those resulting from working memory decay. 
Again, there is the possibility of perfect behaviour, even with substantial instantiation 
memory decay (0.010 per cycle). As might be expected, perfect behaviour became less 
frequent as the decay parameter was increased. However, unlike working memory decay, 
instantiation memory decay can lead to delayed success, where Soar completes its task 
but requires more decisions to do so. In effect Soar can become sidetracked, or forget 
some information, but later recover. This sort of behaviour is most frequently shown with 
substantial degrees of decay in the modified monkeys and bananas task. In general, the 
delay is relatively small requiring perhaps 5 decisions more to complete the task which 
normally requires 24 decisions (i.e., of the order of 20%), but one case with decay 
at 0.010 showed a delay of 170%, eventually correctly solving the 24 decision task in 
65 decisions. Closer examination of this case revealed that Soar repeatedly forgot the 
results of a subgoal before those results could be used, and had to repeatedly recalculate 
the results. 
Discussion: Where Soar failed to complete the task, two sorts of breakdown could be 
distinguished. Frequently Soar appeared to subgoal aimlessly. In other cases, Soar forgot 
its goal, and settled into a “waiting mode”, requiring new input to trigger further problem 
solving. In the case of aimless subgoaling, post hoc probabilistic analysis suggests that, 
given time, Soar would always either revert to this waiting mode or succeed. 
The differences between the behaviour of Soar 4 with and without instantiation mem- 
ory decay shows that this form of decay, like the working memory decay of experiment 2, 
is a critical assumption. As a general memory decay option, however, instantiation mem- 
ory decay appears to be more psychologically plausible in so far as the resulting system 
is more robust and one type of performance degradation-delayed success as a result 
of having to repeat steps-is intuitively plausible. Indeed, this form of behaviour, which 
was not expected, appears to accord with perseveration (i.e., repeated solving of the 
same goal) shown in Newel1 and Simon’s cryptarithmetic protocols [34]. It therefore 
suggests that instantiation memory decay within production system models may be a 
mechanism that warrants further investigation as a possible explanation for perseverative 
behaviour in problem solving. This is a novel result generated from the computational 
experiment: it has not, to our knowledge, been suggested before as a possible explanation 
of such behaviour. 
5. Executable specification languages and modelling methodology 
The work described here represents a step towards the rigorous modelling method- 
ology that we would like to see developed in cognitive science. but any modelling 
language can only form one component of a general methodology. One possible role 
for such a language is as the computational engine within a software development en- 
vironment designed to support all aspects of theory evolution. The environment should 
support computational experiments carried out by means of a modelling language such 
as Sceptic. though we anticipate that more sophisticated executable specification lan- 
guages will emerge in the future. The language should permit variations on a model 
to be investigated and allow criticality/sensitivity analyses, and the environment should 
provide tools for designing and documenting variations to the model, and for collecting 
and analysing data generated by such experiments. 
Preliminary analysis suggests that such an environment might incorporate a Lakatosian 
philosophy, of the sort that Newell advocates [ 311, with a clear division between the 
hard core of a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses. Within such an environment theory 
development would be concerned with adjusting the auxiliary hypotheses corresponding 
to the below-the-line aspects of the model and incorporating assumptions from there 
into the hard core which corresponds to the above-the-line aspects of the model. 
Such a proposed framework for theory development may be too constraining. Although 
in his main exposition of Soar as a psychological mode1 [ 311. Newell advocated a 
cumulative methodology in the spirit of Lakatos [25]. under pressure from critics he 
later took a much weaker position, arguing that 
There is no essential Soar, such that ii‘ we change it we no longer have the Soar 
theory. [ .I It must evolve to be a successful theory at each moment, eliminating 
some concepts and taking on others. But the evolution can lead to almost any 
transformation over time. [ .] As long as each incremental change produces a 
viable [. .] theory from the existing Soar theory, it will still and always be Soar. 
As in evolution. connection is historical. [32. p. 467 (Newell’s emphasis)] 
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Even in this case which we take to be an extreme position, appropriate public criteria for 
theory change are required if the computational research programme is to have scientific 
credibility. Three such criteria, proposed by Anderson [2, pp. 42-431 in the context of 
his theory, ACT*, are: 
(1) There is a broad range of evidence from numerous empirical domains that sup- 
ports the change. 
(2) There is no obvious way to incorporate empirical phenomena within existing 
mechanisms. 
(3) There is a good argument for the adaptive value of the proposed mechanisms. 
We would advocate a fourth: 
(4) The alterations result in an increase in the theory’s criticality/sensitivity ratio. 
Without such criteria, there is a danger that “assumptions will be spun out in a totally 
unprincipled and frivolous way” [ 2, p. 421. 
The methodology we are developing represents an advance on experimental program- 
ming in the sense which we criticised earlier-it is based on well-defined, publicly 
reviewable specifications of models and rigorously conducted, replicable computational 
experiments. 
6. Conclusions 
Mature methodologies for laboratory investigation need to be matched by equally well 
conceived methodologies for constructing and testing computational theories. Current 
methods of building and evaluating computational models of cognition are inadequate, 
particularly if we are entering a period of theoretical unification. As a step towards 
bridging the gap between laboratory investigation and computational theory we have 
argued that it is important to develop executable specification languages. One such 
language is Sceptic. Techniques for specifying models in this language have been devel- 
oped using, as a test case, Soar, one of the most complex and challenging computational 
models in the literature. The results suggest that the specification approach is practical 
for reconstructing the Soar model, and that such models may be clarified by clearly 
separating essential elements of such theories from implementation details. At only 28 
rules, the abstract description of Soar approaches three orders of magnitude smaller than 
a conventional implementation. 
A great deal more work will be needed to realise a comprehensive methodology for 
specifying and testing computational theories, including the development of more so- 
phisticated software tools than Sceptic. A full paradigm for cognitive modelling must 
address two main sets of requirements; the provision of appropriate tools for individ- 
ual modelling experiments, and techniques for supporting research programmes which 
subsume a number of such experiments and the progressive development of theories 
to account for the results. In this paper we have only addressed the first set of re- 
quirements, focusing on the use of improved model specification tools. We have shown 
that, at a minimum, there is substantial scope for improvement in current modelling 
techniques. 
Appendix A. A rational reconstruction of Soar 4 
To illustrate the use of Sceptic this appendix provides details of a Sceptic specification 
of Soar 4. In order to place the specification in context, we precede it with a brief 
summary of the Soar architecture. The specification itself is divided into four sections- 
the top-level loop, the elaboration phase, the decision phase, and chunking-and each 
is developed in sufficient detail to capture the principle features of the published theory. 
The complete A specification as given here consists of 28 rewrite rules. A full set of 
below-the-line functions has been implemented in Prolog, with the behaviour of the 
resulting program corresponding exactly to that of the LISP version of Soar 4 running 
on published examples such as the monkey and bananas problem and the eight puzzle. 
A listing of the full program is available on request. 
A. 1. A summaty of’ the Sour architecture 
A. 1.1. Overview qf‘ processiq 
Soar is an architecture, a fixed information processing structure which is specialised 
to adaptively raise and resolve goals by exploiting a variable body of knowledge. It is 
based upon the well-established approach to modelling problem solving as search in 
a problem space [ 341, Soar implements its search by cyclically retrieving knowledge 
relevant to its current goal (the elaboration phase) and making decisions about the 
results (the decision phase). Loosely. decisions are made about the knowledge to use 
in resolving goals (the problem space to employ), the interpretations to assign to data 
(the state of that problem space), and actions to carry out (the operator to apply to 
the current state). If Soar has sufficient knowledge in a particular context the goal will 
be solved directly. If its knowledge does not embody a solution the architecture will 
impasse; this means that it will automatically generate a new, impasse-specific goal and 
recursively attempt to solve it. If the subgoal succeeds, the impasse is resolved and the 
result becomes available in the parent goal context. During processing of an impasse the 
architecture is able to identify critical contextual data and chunk this as new fragments 
of knowledge for future use. 
A. 1.2. Memories and structures 
The Soar architecture makes the traditional distinction between a transitory or short 
term memory referred to as working memory. and a permanent or long term memory 
referred to as recognition memory. Though the distinction is traditional, it is difficult to 
equate either memory with instances of similar concepts in the psychological literature. 
Working memory, for example, bears little relation to how the concept is currently used 
in the psychological literature (e.g., [ 3 ] ). 
The contents of working memory represent all known aspects of the current problem 
solving context in the form of augmentations, or attribute/value pairs. Augmentations 
describe problem spaces, which are, in effect, the representation in which problem 
solving is or could be carried out, states (features of the current problem solving con- 
text) and operators (external or internal actions which modify the current state). For 
example if the problem space attribute of goal Gl4 has P2 as its value this is repre- 
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sented as the augmentation structure (goal G14 -problem-space P2). If the name 
of the problem space P2 is eight-puzzle then this is represented by the augmentation 
(problem-space P2 “name eight-puzzle). 
Also contained in working memory are preferences. These encode the relative or 
absolute worth of current and potential augmentations. Preferences are primarily used 
in selecting among competing problem spaces, states and operators. A preference may 
indicate, for example, that within the current goal one operator is better than some 
other operator. In Soar 4 preferences and augmentations are stored together in a single 
working memory. 
Recognition memory is closely related to the rule memory of earlier production 
system architectures, and consists of an unstructured set of productions. These represent 
long term knowledge of co-occurrence relations between working memory elements. 
Productions consist of a set of “matches” (templates which must be matched against 
elements in working memory for the production to be applicable) and “makes” (which 
indicate the working memory elements that should be created if the production applies). 
Variables can be shared between template matches and makes, in which case they must 
be consistently bound on any application of the production. Applying a production 
amounts to retrieval of information from long term memory. 
A.1.3. The processing cycle 
The Soar architecture operates in a cyclic fashion, with each cycle consisting of an 
elaboration phase followed by a decision phase. 
The elaboration phase 
The elaboration phase is itself cyclic. Each cycle consists of an input cycle in which 
input/perceptual channels are checked and the results added to working memory, an 
elaboration cycle in which productions are fired (the right-hand sides of applicable 
p;oductions are added to working memory), and an output cycle in which output is 
generated from various designated motor augmentations. The perceptual input and motor 
output cycles are not theoretically well advanced, and we shall not consider these in 
detail here. It is primarily differences in the elaboration cycle which differentiate Soar 4 
from later versions, though in all versions the purpose of the elaboration cycle is two- 
fold: to elaborate the representation of objects in working memory by further augmenting 
those objects; and to create preferences for future possible problem spaces, states, and 
operators. The same basic mechanism, the firing of productions, achieves both of these 
purposes. 
A production may be fired if there is a mapping between existing working memory 
elements and the elements of the left-hand side of that production such that all variables 
in the production’s conditions are consistently mapped. Each consistent mapping yields 
an instantiation of the production. 
One elaboration cycle of Soar 4 consists of firing all production instantiations in 
parallel which are licensed by the contents of working memory but which have not 
previously been fired. This generally results in augmentations and preferences being 
added to working memory. The instantiation is also recorded to prevent subsequent 
identical firings. 
The alterations to working memory caused by each elaboration cycle and subsequent 
input cycle may result in new production instantiations being licensed. These instan- 
tiations are fired in the next elaboration cycle. Cycling within the elaboration phase 
continues until no further instantiations are licensed. At this point, termed quiescence, 
the elaboration phase terminates. 
The decisiotl phase 
The decision phase results in either the selection of a context object (a problem space, 
state, or operator) or the creation of a subgoal in response to an impasse. If a context 
object can be selected based on the preferences available at the beginning of the relevant 
decision cycle. then working memory is modified by replacing the previous value of 
the object with the selected value. If no object can be selected then Soar automatically 
creates a subgoal to resolve the impasse. Soar has general, default knowledge encoded in 
a set of default productions which is used for resolving impasses and thereby permitting 
problem solving to proceed. 
Once a goal has been raised a problem space must be selected. The choice of problem 
space determines the possible states that can arise when solving a problem. In principle 
it might be possible to solve a problem in any of a number of representations. Corre- 
spondingly, operators apply to states and so a state must be selected before an operator 
can he selected. In general, once a problem space and initial state have been selected, 
operators are selected and applied in successive decision cycles until Soar detects that 
the current goal has been achieved. At this point Soar terminates any outstanding sub- 
goals of the achieved goal which are now irrelevant thus restoring the context in which 
the goal originally arose. 
A. 1.4. Leartiitlg 
Soar also includes an experience-based learning mechanism, chunking. which can be 
triggered by the firing of any production. Each production fires in the context of a 
particular goal. When productions fire. any elements created which augment supergoals 
of their firing goal are detected. These elements are used to construct new productions 
(chunks) which are then added to recognition memory. Once a chunk has been created 
it behaves as any other production, so if Soar finds itself attempting to solve a goal 
similar to that which previously lead to a chunk, the chunk will fire, possibly avoiding 
the need for subgoaling in this new situation. The left-hand side of the chunk is built 
from the elements relating to the supergoal and possibly higher goals which contributed 
IO the creation of the subgoal results. The right-hand side of the chunk is built directly 
from the results. 
A.2. A Sceptic speci&atiotz of Soar 4 
A.2.1. The Soar decisiotl cycle 
Ovenierv of the decision cycle 
As described above, top-level processing comprises repeated decision cycles. Each 
decision cycle consists of an elaboration phase where all long term knowledge is brought 
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to bear followed by a decision phase where a decision based on the current preferences 
is effected. 
Above-the-line specification of the decision cycle 
The Soar top-level cycle is captured by two rules, one which effects a single decision 
cycle (consisting of an elaboration phase followed by a decision phase), and one which 
effects repeated decision cycles (by triggering one decision-cycle before triggering 
itself). These rules could be merged into a single rule, but the division distinguishes 









On the occurrence of the trigger soar Sceptic checks the conditions of all relevant 
rules. There is just one rule, and since its conditions are defined to be unconditionally 
true, the triggers on the right-hand side of the rule are issued in sequence, first trig- 
gering a single decision cycle and then recursively triggering soar. On each decision 
cycle, the two triggers on the right-hand side of the second rule, corresponding to the 
elaboration phase and decision phase described above, are called in sequence. Once 
initiated, the soar process cycles indefinitely. There is an obvious difference here be- 
tween the Sceptic specification and the LISP implementations, which allow processing 
to be interrupted. Whilst this is obviously a very useful feature of the implementations, 
it is the first of several clear differences between the implementation and the cognitive 
theory. 
Below-the-line processes in the decision cycle 
The only state tester used in the above specification is true. No generators are 
employed. The two right-hand side triggers not defined above, elaborationphase 
and decisionPhase, can, at a highly abstract level, be classed as primitive updating 
functions. That is, this specification of the top level of Soar may be viewed as an 
extremely coarse specification of the entire architecture, with elaborationphase and 
decisionphase being interpreted as primitive actions. 
Summary and discussion of decision cycle 
Although the specification consists of only two rules it is a substantive summary of 
the Soar processing structure. It specifies, in a formal language which is executable, 
the main subprocesses involved in the Soar architecture, and the way in which those 
processes fit together. 
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Of course. the description is very different from the descriptions of Newell and 
others discussed in Section 2.1. It abstracts away a massive amount of detail: much of 
the theory lies in the primitives elaborationphase and decisionphase which are 
defined below the line. It is the purpose of the remaining specifications in this appendix 
to put this detail back, but to do so in such a way that we only specify the essential 
details. For example the LISP implementations have various mechanisms to interrupt and 
trace the problem solving. From the perspective of specifying the cognitive theory, it is 
important that this specification does not include such details, no matter how obvious 
it is that they are only for implementational purposes, since one cannot be sure that 
the process of providing them may not substantively influence the implementation, the 
system’s behaviour, or even the way theorists interpret the theory. 
A.22 Elaboratiorl phase processes 
O\lervieM, of the elaborution phase 
The Soar architecture takes in information from its environment and stores it in work- 
ing memory. Relevant knowledge is then retrieved by firing productions. This results in 
elements being added to working memory in the elaboration cycle. Finally, distinguished 
working memory elements are interpreted as motor commands. This process is repeated 
until quiescence. 
Aborle-the-line specification cf the elaboration phase 
The elaboration phase consists of eight rules. The first of these effects initialisation 






Initialisation consists of marking all currently existing working memory elements. 
This is necessary because the Soar decision procedure distinguishes between elements 




The rule cycle-if not-quiescent effects cycling within the elaboration phase. The 
antecedent condition tests whether the architecture has become quiescent or not. If Soar 
is quiescent then the trigger will rewrite as the empty sequence of actions, terminating 
the elaboration phase and returning control to the top-level rule which triggers the 
next top-level phase, the decision phase. If quiescence has not been reached then an 
elaboration cycle will be triggered, followed by an output cycle and a further input 
cycle. The rule will then trigger itself recursively, effecting further elaboration, output 
and input, until quiescence is reached and the rule’s condition fails. 







Neither the input cycle nor output cycle are well described in the Soar literature. It 
is clear, however, that the input cycle adds elements to working memory, whereas the 
output cycle effects motor commands based on the contents of working memory. The 
specification given here also assumes that the output cycle removes output commands 
from working memory when those commands have been carried out. 
input-cycle: 
generate_input_wme(WME, Justification) 




wm_remove (WME) . 
The elaboration cycle is specified by a cascade of three rules in which information is 
passed between rules as parameters associated with the rule triggers. The elaboration- 
cycle rule finds all instantiations of productions whose conditions are satisfied by the 
current contents of working memory, and which have not already been fired. Recall that 
variables in Sceptic conditions are universally quantified, so this rule is triggered once 
for each distinct instantiation. The generator generatellnrefractedinstantiation 
also generates a firing goal for each instantiation. This is the lowest goal matched 
in the firing of the production, and it is used when checking that the instantiation 
has not previously been fired (via im-match), when creating an instantiation memory 
element for the particular firing (im-make), and in chunking which is triggered by 
fire-production. The right-hand side of the rule consists of two triggers: imrmake, 
an updater which makes an element in instantiation memory, effectively marking the 
instantiation to prevent future firings of the same instantiation, and fire-production, 
a rule which creates the appropriate working memory elements as specified by the right- 
hand side of the firing production. The create-elements rule adds augmentations and 
preferences to working memory together with their justifications. Justifications are not 















=> wm_make(WME, Justification). 
The build-chunks rule is discussed separately in Section A.2.4. Note that this 
process must follow the creation of working memory elements-it cannot be a par- 
allel process-as it relies upon those elements and their justifications being in mem- 
ory. 
Belowthe-line processes in the elahorution phase 
Two state testers are required in the elaboration phase: quiescent, which succeeds 
when there are no valid production instantiations which have not been fired (i.e., which 
have not already been recorded in instantiation memory); and immatch which checks 
that an instantiation is currently in instantiation memory. This second state tester could 
also be used to generate the elements of instantiation memory. It acts as a state tester 
here because, when it is called, its arguments will be instantiated. 
The elaboration phase requires generators to identify and instantiate productions (to- 
gether with their firing goal) which are applicable during the current elaboration phase 
(generate_unrefractedinstantiation) and to identify the elements (and the jus- 
tification for those elements) which should actually be created by a production fir- 
ing (generate_elements_tomake and generate_justif ication). Generators are 
also used by initialise-elaborationphase, input-cycle. output-cycle, and 
create-elements, which uses member, a standard library generator. 
The principle updater used during the elaboration phase is wmmake. This adds an 
element and its justification to working memory if it is not already present. Several 
other updaters are also employed: wmmark marks an existing working memory element, 
indicating that it existed prior to the current elaboration phase; wmremove removes 
an element from working memory; imnake adds an element and its firing goal to 
instantiation memory; and effectmotor-command is a primitive action intended to 
serve as the interface to the motor system. 
Summary and discussion of elaboration phase 
The essential structure of the elaboration phase is captured by eight Sceptic rules. They 
describe the sequencing of the subprocesses: the creation of working memory elements 
during the input cycle; the firing of all matching but previously unfired productions, and 
the execution of motor commands in the output cycle. As an above-the-line specification 
of all essential processes in the elaboration phase it is complete except for the chunk 
building process. This process, which is triggered by the rule which is responsible for 
firing productions, is discussed in more detail below. 
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The elaboration phase also requires a number of below-the-line functions; six spe- 
cialised functions for testing the processing state and generating results from this, and 
six primitive functions for updating the state. Several of these are also used in other 
phases of processing. 
The modest size of this specification makes it relatively easy to understand the es- 
sential mechanisms of elaboration involved in Soar. The below-the-line functions, which 
we have not described in detail, involve significant programming (14 Prolog proce- 
dures) but are of less importance to researchers wishing to get to grips with the es- 
sential Soar theory, to formulate predictions from it, or to design alternative mecha- 
nisms. 
A.2.3. The decision phase 
Overview of decision phase 
The decision phase attempts to select a problem space, state or operator for the 
current context. If this selection is successful then the selection is installed by adjusting 
the context stack appropriately. If the selection fails an impasse arises and a subgoal to 
resolve it is generated. 
A further aspect of the decision phase not generally discussed concerns the adjustment 
of item augmentations. Impasses that arise when several competing objects are equally 
acceptable for a context slot include in their representation an augmentation of the 
relevant goal for each competing object. These augmentations are referred to as item 
augmentations. Preferences created during an elaboration phase may contradict current 
item augmentations, or suggest further item augmentations, for any goal arising from 
such an impasse. Consequently, after each elaboration phase, any item augmentations of 
a goal that are no longer applicable should be removed and item augmentations should 
be created for any new objects competing in the impasse. In the LISP implementations, 
this process is intertwined with the other algorithms effecting the decision phase, but the 
process is independent, and treating it as such clarifies the specification and the nature 
of item augmentation adjustment. 
Above-the-line specijcation of decision phase 
The decision phase can be viewed as having three parts. One is a cascade of op- 
erations which identify candidate values for the context object, select and install the 
preferred value, and terminate any subgoals which are no longer relevant. This relatively 
simple structure is complicated by the possibility that impasses may arise during the 
operation, so a second set of processes is required to process the impasses and create 
the corresponding subgoals. The distinct process of item augmentation adjustment forms 
a third part of the decision phase. 
If a context slot needs to be (re)decided and this can be determined by looking at 
the newly created preferences in working memory, then the selection process is run 
for that slot. If there is no context slot that needs to be decided then there is a no- 
change impasse. This will occur if, for example, all problem spaces, states and operators 
currently have values and no preferences where generated on the previous elaboration 
phase which should alter those values. 
decision-phase: 
generate_context_pair_to_alter(Goal, Attribute) 




Given that a decision is required for a particular context slot, an object can be chosen 
randomly from the set of possible objects that may, according to the current preferences, 
fill that slot, but only provided that all of those possible values are “mutually indifferent” 
(which may be the case if, for example, the set is empty or if several values have 
conflicting preferences). If the set of possible values is not mutually indifferent then a 




mutually_indifferent(Goal, Attribute, ValueSet) 




not(mutually_indifferent(Goal, Attribute, ValueSet)) 
=> context_slot_impasse(Goal, Attribute, ValueSet). 
The selection and installation process consists of three independent subprocesses: 
( 1 ) a value is selected from among those possible and installed in the appropriate 
slot: 
(2) all context slots within the current goal following the slot on which the decision 
is being made are reinitialised; and 
(3) all goals below the goal which the selected object augments are terminated. 
select_and_install_object(Goal, Attribute, ValueSet): 
random_select(ValueSet, Value) 
=> install_context_object(Goal, Attribute, Value), 
reinitialise_following_attributes(Goal, Attribute), 
terminate_subgoals(Goal). 
install_context_object(Goal, Attribute, Value): 
responsible_preferences(augmentation(goal, Goal, Att=Val), 
Conds) 




=> initialise_attribute(Goal, AttributeToInitialise). 
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Subgoal termination involves removing all working memory elements which are not 
linked to the goal stack above the terminated goal and removing all elements from 
instantiation memory which are no longer relevant. These are all elements whose firing 
goal has been terminated. 
terminate_subgoals(Goal): 
generate_subgoal_wmeUME, Goal) 
=> wm_remove (WME) . 
terminate_subgoals(Goal): 
generate_subgoal_ime(Goal, Instantiation, FiringGoal) 
=> im_remove(Instantiation, FiringGoal). 
Turning to impasse processing, when a context slot impasse occurs, all previous sub- 
goals of the goal on which the impasse arose are terminated and a new subgoal is 
created. Appropriate architecture-generated augmentations are added to that subgoal. 
The attribute in the context slot that caused the impasse, as well as all lower attributes 
within that context, are reinitialised. Creating a subgoal requires a new identifier to be 
generated and several impasse-specific augmentations to be added to working mem- 
ory. 
context_slot_impasse(Goal, Attribute, ValueSet): 




context_slot_impasse(Goal, Attribute, _ValueSet): 
generate_attribute_to_initialise(Attribute, 
AttributeToInitialise) 
=> initialise_attribute(Goal, AttributeToInitialise). 
create_subgoal(Goal, Type, Attribute, ValueSet): 
generate_goal_identifier(SubGoal) 
=> add_subgoal_augmentations(Goal, SubGoal, Type, 
Attribute, ValueSet). 
add_subgoal_augmentations(SuperGoal, Goal, Type, 
Attribute, ValueSet): 
generate_impasse_augentationf,SuperGoal, Goal, Type, 
Attribute, ValueSet, 
Att=Val, Justification) 
=> wm_make(augmentation(goal, Goal, Att=Val), Justification). 
The processing required for a no-change impasse is similar except that, because 
no-change impasses can only occur on the lowest context slot of the lowest goal, 
no subgoals need be terminated and no context slots need be reinitialised. Instead a 




=> create_subgoal(Goal, no-change, _, _>. 
The Sceptic reconstruction highlights two distinct types of impasse: those arising from 
situations in which no context slot should be altered (no-change impasses), and those 
arising from situations where a choice is required, but no choice can be made (context 
slot impasses). The different types of impasse arise at different stages of processing, 
and in response to different failures of problem solving. However, the distinction, whilst 
often discussed within the Soar community at the level of problem spaces, states and 
operators. rather than the level of individual Soar productions, is not generally regarded 
as a distinction made within the architecture. The Sceptic reconstruction demonstrates 
that genuine processing differences underlie the distinction. 
The basic structure of the item adjustment step is straightforward. This is captured 
by a pair of rules, one of which is responsible for removing invalid augmentations 
and one for creating new ones. Both of these rules are triggered by decision-phase, 
corresponding to the fact that this process, which can be treated independently of the 
rest of the decision phase, is triggered when a decision phase is triggered. 
decision-phase: 
wm_match(augmentation(goal, Goal, item=Item)), 
not(generate_item_augmentation(Goal, Item, Justification)) 
=> wm_remove(augmentation(goal, Goal, item=Item)). 
decision-phase: 
generate_item_augmentation(Goal, Item, Justification), 
not(wm_match(augmentation(goal, Goal, item=Item))) 
=> wm_make(augmentation(goal, Goal, item=Item), Justification). 
Below-the-line speci$catiotz of the decisiotl phase 
A number of special generators are required for decision phase processing. These 
recognise conditions where context objects need to be installed, and generate possible 
candidates, augmentations, justifications, subgoals and so forth. A single state tester, 
for determining whether alternative context objects are mutually indifferent, is also 
required. 
General updaters are required for adding and removing elements from working mem- 
ory, as well as for initialising context slots and removing elements from instantiation 
memory. 
Item adjustment requires two left-hand side conditions. In the first rule, wmmatch is 
used to generate an existing item augmentation and generateitemaugmentation is 
used to check whether this item augmentation is justified. If not, the item augmentation 
is removed. The second rule uses these conditions in the opposite way. generate-item- 
augmentation is used to generate an item augmentation and its justification and if that 
augmentation is not present in working memory then it is added. 
The only updating mechanisms required during item adjustment are the standard 
operations for adding and deleting items from working memory (wmmake and wm_ 
remove). 
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Summary and discussion 
Decision phase processing is the most complex part of the Soar architecture, and this 
is reflected in the relative complexity of the Sceptic specification, which consists of 14 
rules and 12 specialised generators. Again, the generators require significant coding, but 
the complexity of this coding is not relevant at the required level of abstraction of the 
Soar cognitive theory. 
Item adjustment is conceptually a simple mechanism for ensuring that current aug- 
mentations are consistent and complete. This simplicity is reflected in the brevity of 
the above-the-line specification. This specification does suggest, however, that item ad- 
justment can be seen as a restricted form of truth maintenance, similar to those truth 
maintenance systems developed in AI [26] and explicitly employed in later versions of 
Soar, though for a different purpose. 
A.2.4. Chunking 
Overview of chunking 
Chunks are created whenever a production which fired within the context of the most 
recent subgoal adds elements to a context associated with a supergoal. The right-hand 
side of the chunk is derived from those elements added to the supercontext, with the 
left-hand side being determined by recursively tracing the justifications of the elements 
which triggered the production to elements in supercontexts. 
Above-the-line description of chunking 
The above-the-line specification of chunking consists of just two rules. The first rule 
attempts to build the appropriate chunk given a production’s firing goal and results. 
build_chunks(FiringGoal, Results): 
generate_lowest_goal(FiringGoal), 






=> add_chunk(VariablisedChunk, InstantiatedChunk) . 
The second rule only fires if the potential chunk generated by the first rule does not 
duplicate any previously learned chunk. If this rule does fire, it adds the new chunk to 
recognition memory and refracts it by adding the appropriate instantiation to instantiation 





=> im_make(InstantiatedChunk, FiringGoal), 
rm_make (Variablisedchunk) . 
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These two rules could be merged into a single rule, but the separation appears to be 
a natural one. The first rule essentially generates a potential new element of recognition 
memory, and the second rule records this element if it does not duplicate an existing 
element. 
Belm,-the-line descriptiorl qf churzkirlg 
A single state tester in the first rule ensures that chunking only occurs when the 
tiring goal is the most recently created subgoal. Several generators are also used by this 
rule to generate the chunk from the firing goal and results. The first, new-supergoal- 
elements, generates the subset of results which belong to the supercontext. The second, 
conditionsprior-to-goal, determines the working memory elements from the su- 
percontext which indirectly led to creation of these results. The third, assemble-chunk, 
uses the results of the previous two generators to construct an instantiated version of 
the final chunk. Finally, the generator variablise-chunk generates an uninstantiated 
chunk from the instantiated version by replacing all identifiers with variables. 
The second rule also uses a single state tester, checking that the generated chunk does 
not duplicate an existing production. The firing goal of the chunk is generated so that 
the appropriate information may be added to instantiation memory. 
Summary and discussion 
In its barest form chunking is very simple. As with other Soar processes, the above- 
the-line specification of chunking is very brief. Considerable detail is again hidden below 
the line. but this reveals that at this level of abstraction chunking is not a complex pro- 
cedure. Nevertheless, there are several differences between this specification and the 
LISP implementation. Most notable of these is that in our specification chunking is 
restricted to the most recently created subgoal. whereas chunking in the LISP imple- 
mentations is switchable between this and chunking over all goals. Newell [31] argues 
from psychological data that chunking in the human information processing architec- 
ture is bottom-up. All-goals chunking has therefore been disregarded here. More minor 
details present in the LISP implementations of chunking but not in this specification 
include: partitioning of results into linked subsets, with each such subset leading to dis- 
tinct chunks: expansion of each subset of results to include all elements linked via some 
chain of working memory elements to one of the results; removal of condition matches 
which add little constraint to the potential matching of the chunk; addition of inequality 
restrictions to matches within the chunk; splitting of operator application chunks into 
subchunks which separately apply the operator and create the new state; and the filtering 
of potential chunks generated in certain problem spaces. The omission of these aspects 
is justified by their dubious status as part of the Soar cognitive theory-while they are 
described in the manuals which accompany the Soar implementations [ 22,241, they are 
not mentioned in cognitive psychological descriptions of Soar [ 23,31,40]. 
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